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Exploring the Effects of the ‘Bonus Cap’ Rule: The Impact of 
Remuneration Structure on Risk-Taking by Bank Managers 
 
This article explores the effects of the bonus cap rule on UK banks’ remuneration practices with 
a view to evaluating its likely impact on the financial incentives faced by senior managers to 
make risky business decisions. The main argument is that the ratio of variable to fixed 
remuneration is only one of the factors that determine the intensity of financial incentives for UK 
bank managers to make risky decisions. More crucially, the steps taken by major UK banks to 
evade the effects of the cap by introducing fixed pay allowances, which are paid in shares but are 
legally structured as fixed remuneration, have created additional risk-taking incentives. Indeed, 
it is shown that paying part of executive remuneration in shares as such, rather than partly 
determining the amount of remuneration based on corporate financial performance, is a 
significant driver of risk-taking.  It follows that there is no reason to believe that the bonus cap 
has achieved any improvement in bank senior managers incentives and, therefore, that EU law’s 
emphasis on the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is misplaced. 
Keywords: bonus cap, executive remuneration, CRD IV Directive, prudential regulation, 
corporate governance, variable remuneration 
 
I. Introduction 
The 4th Capital Requirements Directive, known as CRD IV,1 contains a controversial provision 
setting an upper limit to the amount of variable remuneration bank senior managers can receive 
                                                          
1 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
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as a function of their fixed remuneration (the bonus cap rule). Unsurprisingly, this provision 
has been opposed by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which has noted that the 
significant increase in fixed remuneration, as a result of the new rule, is likely to weaken banks 
in times of crisis, as earned fixed remuneration cannot be clawed back.2 In a similar vein, in 
September 2013 the Treasury brought an unsuccessful legal challenge against the bonus cap 
rule on the grounds of lack of competence by the European Union to legislate in the area.3  
This article explores the effects of the implementation of the bonus cap rule on UK 
banks’ remuneration practices and risk-taking incentives for bank senior managers. The 
ultimate aim is to assess whether the new rule is likely to change financial incentives in a way 
that is conducive to lower risk-taking, thus enhancing the safety and soundness of individual 
financial institutions. In doing so, the discussion draws on the law and economics school of 
thought, neoclassical economics and behavioural economics, which will be used to explore the 
likely effects of the new rule on the behaviour of senior managers. As such, it adds to the 
existing literature not only on executive remuneration but more broadly, as the insights 
regarding the relationship between external financial incentives created by legal rules and risk-
taking are relevant to a broad range of issues in corporate law and financial regulation.   
The main argument advanced herein is that the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration 
is only one of the many factors that determine the intensity of financial incentives for UK bank 
managers to take decisions which are optimal for bank shareholders but increase banks’ 
                                                          
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338. From now on, it will be 
abbreviated as ‘CRD IV’. 
2 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Strengthening Capital Standards: Implementing CRD IV, Feedback and Final 
Rules’ (PRA PS7/13, 2013), 4.7 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/implemcrdiv.aspx>. 
3 Case C-507/13 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council [2013] was lodged on 20 September 2013 and was 
removed from the register on 4 May 2015.  
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insolvency risk (and, more broadly, their risk of failure). Strictly speaking, neither the amount 
nor the ratio of variable remuneration per se matter, but rather pay-performance sensitivity, for 
which the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is not necessarily a good proxy. More 
crucially, the steps taken by major UK banks to evade the effects of the cap by introducing 
fixed pay allowances, which are paid in shares but do not depend on performance and hence 
are legally categorised as fixed remuneration, create additional financial incentives for senior 
bank managers to increase banks’ risk of failure. Indeed, it is shown that paying part of 
executive remuneration in shares in itself, rather than determining part of the amount of 
remuneration on the basis on corporate financial performance, is probably the main driver of 
risk taking.  
Despite the forthcoming withdrawal of the UK from the EU in 2019, critical 
engagement with CRD IV remains practically relevant, as it is a piece of EU law with EEA 
relevance and will thus still apply to the UK if it joins the European Economic Area,4 or reaches 
any type of agreement that preserves single market access for UK financial institutions. The 
rule is also of considerable academic interest, as it showcases the challenges associated with 
using command-and-control regulation5 to regulate senior executive remuneration. 
The article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief doctrinal exposition of the 
bonus cap rule and the broader framework of regulatory rules on the structure of executive 
                                                          
4 The European Economic Area was established by the Agreement on the European Economic Area, signed in 
Porto on 2 May 1992 [1994] OJ L1/3, and became effective on 1 January 1994. A detailed analysis of the status 
of EU law in EEA countries can be found in A Kokkinis, ‘The Impact of Brexit on the Legal Framework for 
Cross-Border Corporate Activity’ (2016) 27 EBLR 959, 963 – 966. See also L Lu, ‘The End of Bankers’ Bonus 
Cap: How Will the UK Regulate Bankers’ Remuneration after Brexit?’ (2016) 27 EBLR 1091. 
5 For a succinct discussion of the notion of command-and-control regulation, see J Black, ‘Paradoxes and Failures: 
‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75 MLR 1037, 1041 – 1042.  
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remuneration in banks. Part III establishes that the main policy rationale for the bonus cap rule 
is to strengthen financial stability, rather than to protect bank shareholders against excessive 
remuneration, or to curb the amount of remuneration. Part IV puts forward a conceptual 
framework of the relationship between remuneration structure and risk-taking in light of 
empirical economic research. Part V presents evidence from major UK banks documenting 
their response to the bonus cap rule. Based on these findings, Part VI evaluates the overall 
impact of the rule on financial stability. Part VII concludes.  
 
II. A brief doctrinal analysis of the bonus cap rule and of the framework of 
structural rules on executive remuneration in banks 
The purpose of this section is to examine the CRD IV provisions which regulate the ratio 
between fixed and variable remuneration.6 It will also explain how this rule fits within the 
broader structural regulatory framework applicable to executive remuneration in UK banks. As 
a preliminary point, it is worth noting that, in all large companies, fixed remuneration includes 
an executive’s salary, pension contributions, and benefits in kind. Variable remuneration 
typically includes two types of remuneration: annual bonus awards which depend on a 
manager’s performance during the relevant year; and awards of shares under Long-Term 
Incentive Plans (LTIPs) which vest after a period of time (usually three to five years) subject 
to the achievement of certain performance conditions.7  
                                                          
6 CRD IV rules on remuneration are implemented in the UK via the PRA Rulebook and FCA Handbook. As this 
article focuses on major banks which are regulated by the PRA, all references will be to the PRA Rulebook.  
7 For a detailed discussion of the various components of senior executive remuneration, see MT Moore, ‘Design 
and Control of Remuneration in UK Banks’ in IHY Chiu, The Law on Corporate Governance in Banks (Edward 
Elgar, 2015), 134 – 139. 
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CRD IV introduced a cap on bonuses and other forms of variable remuneration paid to 
senior management of credit institutions and investment firms8  as a percentage of their fixed 
remuneration. Indeed, variable remuneration cannot exceed 100% of fixed remuneration,9 
unless the shareholders approve a higher rate, up to 200%.10 The Directive prescribes the 
procedure to be followed in detail. Shareholders must be given reasonable notice and must be 
provided with a detailed statement on the impact of the proposed increase in variable pay on 
the bank’s ability to maintain a sound capital base. In addition, the resolution approving the 
increase must be passed by at least 66% of the share capital provided that at least 50% of the 
shares are represented at the meeting, or by 75% of the share capital. Any shares held by 
individuals who are personally affected by the decision (e.g. directors or managers) are 
disqualified from voting. 
In parallel, the Directive enables Member States to allow banks to apply a discounted 
rate to up to 25% of total variable remuneration11 provided that it is paid in instruments that 
                                                          
8 The Directive defines its scope of application as covering all material risk takers including ‘senior management, 
risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into 
the same remuneration bracket as senior management’. See CRD IV, article 94 (2). The exact scope of the CRD 
IV remuneration rules was decided by the European Banking Authority in 2014. See Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate 
quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an 
institution's risk profile [2014] OJ L167/30. For a discussion of these standards see J Cullen and G Johnsen, 
‘Promoting Bank Stability through Compensation Reform: Lessons from Iceland’ (2015) 11 Icelandic Review of 
Politics & Administration 333, 340 – 342. 
9 See CRD IV, article 94 (1) (g) (i). Implemented by PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.9. 
10 See CRD IV, article 94 (1) (g) (ii). Implemented by PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.10 – 15.12. 
11 CRD IV, article 94 (1) (g) (iii).  Implemented by PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.13. 
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are deferred for at least 5 years in accordance with guidelines prepared by the European 
Banking Authority. The Guidelines take into account four factors to calculate the rate of 
discount, namely: the national inflation rate, the average interest rate paid on EU sovereign 
bonds, the length of the deferral period and any additional retention period requirement.12 
According to the complex formula used, assuming that 25% of variable remuneration is paid 
in appropriate instruments and is deferred for 5 years, variable remuneration can reach up to 
114.19% of fixed remuneration (or 228.38% with shareholder approval).13 Therefore, assuming 
that a bank obtains shareholder approval to extend variable pay to 200% of fixed pay and takes 
full advantage of the discounted rate, the bonus cap rule allows variable remuneration to be up 
to 228% of fixed remuneration, that is, up to 69.5% of the total remuneration package. 
Evidently the new rule presupposes a clear distinction between fixed and variable types 
of remuneration. This has become a major regulatory policy issue due to the use of a new type 
of ostensibly fixed remuneration by UK banks, typically described as fixed pay allowances or 
role-based allowances. As will be seen in Part V, these allowances are paid in shares which 
cannot be sold for a period of time. Unsurprisingly, the European Banking Authority was not 
convinced that they constitute fixed remuneration and sought to constrain their use. The 
relevant guidance asserts that all elements of remuneration are for the purposes of the Directive 
either fixed or variable and it is each bank’s responsibility to decide the nature of each 
component of its executive pay package. Any type of remuneration which is described by an 
institution as fixed, but is in any way conditional on past or future performance or can be 
                                                          
12 See EBA, ‘Guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate for variable remuneration’ (27 March 2014) 
EBA/GL/2014/01 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-discount-rate-
for-variable-remuneration>. 
13 Ibid, 22.  
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unilaterally altered during an employee’s term of employment, is, in fact, variable remuneration 
for regulatory purposes. The competent national authority must thus ensure that banks do not 
evade the overall ratio by using remuneration which is essentially variable but purports to be 
fixed.14 This has led major UK banks to remove one feature of their fixed pay allowances, 
namely the explicit provision that the amount of the allowance is to be reviewed annually, 
which was typical in 2014 – immediately after the coming into force of the new rule.15 Still, 
the EBA guidance does not restrict the possibility of altering an element of a remuneration 
package by individual renegotiation of the terms of an employment contract and thus flexibility 
in this regard is not totally lost. Also, nothing prevents banks from entering into yearly contracts 
of employment with senior management.  
To appreciate the likely impact of the bonus cap provision from a UK perspective it is 
expedient to offer an overview of its immediate context i.e. the broader remuneration 
framework for UK banks. This framework was not extensively reformed by the CRD IV 
Directive because the Directive largely duplicated rules and procedures that were already in 
place in the UK since the onset of the recent financial crisis. Indeed, the Financial Services Act 
201016 vested the Prudential Regulation Authority with new responsibilities on executive 
remuneration, including the duty to require regulated firms to adopt a remuneration policy 
                                                          
14 See European Banking Authority, ‘Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) 
of Directive 2013/36/EU and disclosures under art 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013’ (EBA/GL/2015/22, 
2015), 120 – 123 <http://www.eba.europa.eu/document-library>.   
15 As evinced from the latest annual reports of major UK banks with respect to 2016. 
16 Section 6, which inserts section 139A into the FSMA 2000.  
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consistent with effective risk management17 and, most importantly, the power to prohibit 
relevant persons from being remunerated in a way that contravenes the above standards.  
With regard to structural requirements, the provision of guaranteed variable 
remuneration is prohibited other than to new staff and for the first year of their employment.18 
The fixed component of remuneration must be high enough to enable firms to not pay any 
variable remuneration when performance is poor.19 In addition, the Code requires that at least 
50% of variable remuneration be paid in shares or similar share-linked instruments rather than 
cash.20 The Code also requires large UK banks to defer at least 60% of variable senior executive 
remuneration for at least three years, but for five years for those designated as risk takers and 
seven years for senior managers, a category which includes executive directors.21  The deferred 
element must vest no faster than on a pro rata basis i.e. equally on each anniversary of the 
grant with no vesting for the first three years in the case of executive directors. All these 
                                                          
17 The policy must also be consistent with the 2009 Implementation Standards for Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices issued by the Financial Stability Board, according to section 139 A (3) (b) FSMA. See 
PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 6.2. This is also required by CRD IV, art 92 (2) (a). 
18 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.7. 
19 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.9 (2). 
20 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.15. 
21 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.17 and 15.18. In particular, all regulated firms are expected to 
defer 40% of remuneration. However, with regard to large payments (in excess of 500,000 euros) and payments 
to executive directors of firms that are large of complex, 60% of remuneration must be deferred. This evidently 
covers the executive directors and senior managers of all major UK banks. The monetary limit was introduced by 
CRD IV, article 94 (1) (m). A discussion of the policy behand this can be found in PRA, ‘Strengthening the 
alignment of risk and reward: new remuneration rules’ (2015) PRA PS12/15, 7 – 8, 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/ps/2015/ps1215.aspx>. 
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provisions are also included in CRD IV.22 Furthermore, banks tend to require senior managers 
by contract to maintain minimum levels of shareholding.23 Crucially, banks are required to 
reduce any unvested remuneration (this is known as a malus), and take reasonable steps to 
recover any vested variable remuneration (this is known as a clawback) in case a senior 
manager is found guilty of misconduct or if there is a significant failure of risk management 
within a seven-year period.24 
Furthermore, regulatory rules demand firms to risk-adjust any profit-related metrics 
used to assess performance, in line with principles of sound risk management.25 Consequently, 
profitability is no longer exclusively assessed by (absolute or relative) total shareholder return 
and earnings per share, but rather some major banks use return on risk-weighted assets. In 
parallel, banks are required by CRD IV to use a variety of non-profit-related metrics alongside 
profit-related ones.26 Non-profit-related criteria typically include: capital strength, liquidity, 
minimisation of bad loans, customer satisfaction, compliance, risk management, corporate 
reputation, and strategy development. 
In addition to bank-specific rules, remuneration is also regulated by general company 
law and corporate governance rules – mostly of procedural nature.27 The UK Corporate 
Governance Code recommends that listed companies establish a remuneration committee, 
                                                          
22 CRD IV, art 94.   
23 All major UK banks have a policy of requiring their executive directors to continue to own beneficially a 
minimum number of shares defined as a function of their salary for the duration of their employment.  
24 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.22 and 15.23 respectively.  
25 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 11.2 – 11.6.  
26 CRD IV, art 94 (1) (a). 
27 For a detailed doctrinal analysis of the legal, regulatory and soft law framework on executive remuneration in 
banks, see Moore (above n 7), 140 – 167.   
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consisting of independent directors, responsible for setting the remuneration of executive 
directors and senior management.28 In parallel, the Companies Act 2006 requires quoted public 
companies to have an annual advisory vote on directors’ remuneration report,29 and a triennial 
legally binding vote on remuneration policy.30 
 
III. The policy behind regulating the structure of executive remuneration in 
banks: prioritising financial stability over shareholder profit maximisation 
Contrary to conventional wisdom in corporate governance,31 the regulation of executive 
remuneration in banks prioritises financial stability over shareholder profit maximisation. No 
doubt, the significance of remuneration practices as a contributing factor to the 2007 – 2009 
financial crisis has been acknowledged by the Financial Stability Board, which responded in 
2009 by issuing a set of principles aiming at aligning remuneration in financial institutions with 
prudent risk-taking.32 The FSB principles have been influential internationally and in the EU, 
                                                          
28 See UK Corporate Governance Code, Provisions D.2.1 and D.2.2. For banks having an independent 
remuneration committee is mandatory by virtue of CRD IV, art 92, which has been implemented in the UK by 
PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 7.4.  
29 Companies Act 2006, s 439. This rule was first introduced in 2002.  
30 Companies Act 2006, s 439A, inserted by s 79 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.  
31 For a succinct discussion of the rise of shareholder value from a USA perspective, see W Lazonick and M 
O'Sullivan, ‘Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance’ (2000) 29 Economy and 
Society 13. An excellent analysis of the theoretical foundations of corporate contractarianism can be found in MT 
Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism’ (2014) 
34 OJLS 693, 698 – 706.  
32 See Financial Stability Forum, ‘FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’ (2009) 
<http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/building-resilience-of-financial-
12 | P a g e  
 
but CRD IV went above and beyond their requirements in adopting a highly prescriptive 
approach to the regulation of executive remuneration in financial institutions.  
The policy rationale behind the CRD IV cap on performance-based remuneration is 
exactly to undermine incentives for senior managers to take risks that may lead to the failure33 
of a financial institution, by reducing their financial benefits from such risk-taking, even 
regarding risks that are optimal for shareholders. This reflects the fact that mechanisms which 
can be effective in attenuating the shareholder-manager agency problem are not well-placed to 
prevent excessive risk taking from the taxpayers’ perspective. 34 Indeed, the stated purpose of 
the Directive’s approach to remuneration is to reduce financial incentives to engage in 
excessive risk taking, which is perceived as one of the main causes of bank failures and 
financial instability generally. For instance, the preamble of the Directive states that:  
                                                          
institutions/compensation/> accessed 4 February 2018, discussed in E Ferran, ‘New Regulation of Remuneration 
in the Financial Sector in the EU’ (2012) 9 ECFR 1, 4 – 14.  
33 Bank failure is a much broader notion than insolvency in the sense of the Insolvency Act 1986, s 122. Indeed, 
bank failure is defined in section 37 (9) – (10) of the Banking Reform Act 2013, as follows: (i) entering into 
ordinary and special bank insolvency proceedings; (ii) the use of any stabilisation option provided by the Banking 
Act 2009, and (iii) the inability or likely inability of a bank to satisfy claims for the purposes of the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme. 
34 See JE Thanassoulis and M Tanaka, ‘Bankers' Pay and Excessive Risk’ (2015) Bank of England Staff Working 
Paper No. 558 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2015/swp558.pdf>; and A 
Kokkinis, Corporate Law and Financial Instability (Routledge, 217) ch 1. On the particular issue of the interplay 
between remuneration design and systemic risk, see RA Albuquerque, LMB Cabral and J Guedes, ‘Relative 
Performance, Banker Compensation, and Systemic Risk’ (2016) ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 490/2016 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2884076>.  
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Weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of institutions have contributed to 
excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector which has led to the failure 
of individual institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally.35  
The Directive then identifies excessive levels of variable remuneration as one such weakness,36 
and asserts that a mandatory upper limit with regard to the ratio between the two forms of 
remuneration ought to be imposed.37  
It is also worth noting that safeguarding the stability of the UK financial system38 has 
been, since the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis, one of the regulatory objectives of UK financial 
regulation authorities enshrined in primary legislation. Indeed, the Banking Act 2009 added a 
financial stability objective to the list of the statutory objectives of the Bank of England.39 
                                                          
35 CRD IV, Preamble, para 53. 
36 For an academic critique of the mismatch between bank executive remuneration and long-term performance, 
see LA Bebchuk, A Cohen and H Spamann, ‘The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Sterns and 
Lehman 2000 – 2008’ (2010) 27 Yale Journal on Regulation 257.   
37 See CRD IV, Preamble, para 65.  
38 Financial stability, although intuitively appealing, is an elusive concept that is hard to give a precise definition 
to. Davies and Green argue that it is very difficult to say ex ante if a given financial system is stable or not, but 
with the benefit of hindsight one can define instability as loss of normalcy and resilience. See H Davies and D 
Green, Banking on the Future: The Rise and Fall of Central Banking (Princeton University Press, 2010), ch 3.  
39 Banking Act 2009, s 238 (1) inserting s 2A to the Bank of England Act 1998. Similarly, the Financial Services 
Act 2010 added financial stability to the objectives of the Financial Services Authority. Financial Services Act 
2010, s 1 (3) inserting s 3A into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Act will be henceforth 
abbreviated as ‘FSMA 2000’. 
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Furthermore, the Financial Services Act 2012 strengthened the formulation of the financial 
stability objective of the Bank40 and introduced the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee.41  
That being said, some scholars have doubted that financial incentives set by the 
structure of executive remuneration did not play any material role in risk-taking by executives 
during the 2007 – 2009 financial crisis. Indeed, empirical research on US financial institutions 
indicates that failed indicates that their executives had not anticipated their collapse, as they 
did not sell their shares in time. In addition, senior executives in failed institutions suffered 
tremendous personal financial losses of at least $30 million on average. 42 However, the same 
study found that institutions in which CEOs’ incentives were more tightly aligned with the 
interests of the shareholders performed worse than others during the crisis. This supports the 
view that aligning the interests of managers with those of the shareholders undermines the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions.  
Indeed, Bebchuk et al demonstrate that a proper interpretation of available empirical 
evidence supports the claim that financial incentives were – at least partly – to blame for 
                                                          
40 The Act requires the Bank to ‘protect and enhance the stability of the financial system of the UK’ rather than 
merely to contribute ‘to the protection and enhancement’ of financial stability, as the previous statutory 
formulation was. See Financial Services Act 2012, s 2 (2). 
41 The FPC is charged – inter alia – with contributing to the achievement of the Bank’s financial stability objective. 
See Bank of England Act 1998, s 9C (inserted by the Financial Services Act 2012, s 4).  
42 R Fahlenbrach and R Stulz, ‘Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis’ (2010) Dice Center Working Paper 
2009-13 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859>. See also DO Edwards, ‘An Unfortunate Tail: Reconsidering 
Risk Management Incentives after the Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009’ (2010) 81 U Colo L Rev 247.  
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excessive risk-taking by financial institution managers.43 After reviewing the overall gains and 
losses of the executives of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns from 2000 to 2008, the authors 
conclude that the management teams of these institutions earned as a group more than $1 billion 
in variable remuneration, which greatly exceeds their losses when the two institutions failed. 
There is also empirical evidence from American retail banks that in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis the remuneration of CEOs was made more responsive to performance so as to 
create stronger incentives for CEOs to exploit new (risky) opportunities, and that CEOs 
responded positively to these incentives by taking more risk.44 Moreover, evidence from 
European banks suggests that large long-term incentive plan rewards for CEOs are positively 
correlated with an increased likelihood of failure.45  
Furthermore, the causal link between shareholder empowerment and bank distress at 
times of crisis has recently been empirically confirmed. A major study by Erkens et al assessed 
the impact of ownership structure on the performance of financial institutions during the 2007 
– 2009 financial crisis. The study examined the impact of the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors on the stock returns of 296 financial firms (primarily banks) from 30 
countries during the 2007 – 2008 period.46 It found that firms with a higher percentage of 
                                                          
43 LA Bebchuk, A Cohen and H Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Sterns and 
Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010) ECGI Finance Working Paper No 287/2010 <http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1513522>. 
See also LA Bebchuk and H Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers' Pay’ (2010) 98 Geo LJ 247, 271 – 275. 
44 R DeYoung, E Peng and M Yan, ‘Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial 
Banks’ (2013) 48 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 165. 
45 See R Ayadi, E Arbak, and WP De Groen, ‘Executive Compensation and Risk-talking in European Banking’ 
in J Barth, C Lin, and C Wihlborg (eds), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance (Edward 
Elgar, 2012). 
46 See D Erkens, M Hung and P Matos, ‘Corporate Governance in the 2007 – 2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence 
from Financial Institutions Worldwide’ (2012) 18 Journal of Corporate Finance 389, 389 – 392. 
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institutional ownership experienced worse share returns during the crisis. To further explore 
this finding the authors tested whether higher institutional ownership led to higher risk taking 
and concluded that firms with a higher percentage of institutional ownership took higher risk 
before the crisis, which caused them to perform worse during the crisis. 47 This finding is 
corroborated by Ferreira et al’s recent empirical study which also confirms that banks in which 
managers were more insulated from shareholder pressures were less likely to fail during the 
2007 – 2009 crisis. The explanation suggested is that bank shareholders tend to push banks to 
take a level of risk that is excessive from the point of view of society. 48  
In light of the above discussion, the prescriptive provisions of the Directive on the 
special majorities and quorums required to extend the total level of variable pay from 100% to 
200% of fixed pay49 appear paradoxical. These provisions suggest that the drafters of the 
Directive viewed the cap as potentially beneficial to shareholders who are thus protected from 
an extension to 200 per cent, unless it is approved by a special majority. This, of course, is at 
                                                          
47 This may sound paradoxical, but it has to be kept in mind that most business strategies engender an element of 
risk if they fail, and thus following good business strategies still increases the overall insolvency risk of the 
relevant corporate entity. For an explanation of the divergence between the optimal level of risk for bank 
shareholders, on the one hand, and for society as a whole, on the other, see A Kokkinis, ‘A Primer on Corporate 
Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions – Are Banks Special?’ in HYI Chiu (ed), The Law on Corporate 
Governance in Banks (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
48 D Ferreira and others, ‘Measuring Management Insulation from Shareholder Pressure’ (2013) ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No 345/2013 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170392##>. Other studies 
that support the same conclusion include: G Ferrarini, ‘Bankers’ Compensation and Prudential Supervision’ in 
Jennifer Hill and Randall Thomas (eds), Research Handbook on Executive Compensation (Edward Elgar, 2012); 
and A Saunders, E Strock, and NG Travlos, ‘Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking’ (1990) 
45 The Journal of Finance 643. 
49 CRD IV, article 94 (1) (g) (ii). 
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odds with the both the theoretical understanding of the risk neutrality of diversified investors 
and with the empirical evidence reviewed in the previous paragraphs, as the cap explicitly seeks 
to undermine the alignment of incentives between senior managers and bank shareholders by 
discouraging the former from taking risks that are optimal for the latter. So, we would expect 
all banks to secure a nearly unanimous approval to extend the cap to 200% which, as will be 
shown in the next part of the article, was the case in the UK. It follows that the Directive’s 
emphasis on shareholder voting as a gatekeeper is misplaced and misses the point of the 
fundamental misalignment between shareholder interests and the public interest. If it is thought 
that a cap of 100% is necessary – which the argument herein by no means supports – then it 
would make sense to dispense with the possibility of extending it with shareholder approval.  
 
IV. A conceptual framework on remuneration structure and risk taking  
Until 2009 all major UK banks were companies whose share ownership was separated from 
their control, having no shareholder with a controlling stake. This changed for the banks that 
received government support in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. Of the two major banks 
that received such support, the Government has now disposed of all its shares in Lloyds, but 
has retained a majority stake in RBS, which is however managed on a commercial basis.50  
The main purpose of executive employment contracts in widely-held companies is to 
attract and retain talented individuals and provide them with incentives to pursue shareholder 
                                                          
50 The government’s investment has taken place through a separate corporate entity, the UK Financial Investments 
Ltd (UKFI). On 31 March 2017, UKFI held approximately 71.2% of the equity capital of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc. By 17 May 2017 UKFI Ltd held no shares in Lloyds’ Banking Group plc. See UK Financial 
Investments Limited (UKFI) Annual Report and Accounts 2016/17, Cm 9451 (2017). 
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value while keeping transaction costs at an optimal level. 51 According to agency theory, senior 
managers are – economically speaking – shareholders’ agents and as such, they are likely to 
pursue their personal interest or put suboptimal effort unless appropriate incentives are in place. 
This applies inter alia to senior managers’ willingness to take an optimal level of risk from the 
shareholders’ perspective. The pioneering work of Jensen and Murphy in 199052  demonstrated 
that the remuneration of American CEOs was not linked to performance, and was lower during 
the 1980s than during the 1930s. They urged companies to increase variable remuneration, as 
better-aligned incentives would leave shareholders better-off.53 In order to understand the 
relationship between financial incentives and risk taking for corporate managers it is necessary 
to provide an overview of the way economics models human behaviour and in particular 
preferences and attitudes to risk. In doing so, the discussion will incorporate the insights of 
                                                          
51 See FH Easterbrook, ‘Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence’ (1984) 9 Del J 
Corp L 540; DR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35 Vand L Rev 1259; SJ Grossman and 
OD Hart, ‘An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem’ (1983) 51 Econometrica 7; B Holmstrom, ‘Moral Hazard 
in Teams’ (1982) 13 Bell Journal of Economics 324; A Edmans and X Gabaix, ‘Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? 
A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories’ (2009) 15 European Financial Management 486.  
52 See MC Jensen and KJ Murphy, ‘CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How’ [1990] Harvard 
Business Review 138.  
53 Of course, other scholars have argued that given the very limited decision-making powers of US shareholders, 
variable remuneration has been used as a way to camouflage excessive executive remuneration. See e.g. LA 
Bebchuk, JM Fried and DI Walker, ‘Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation’ (2002) 69 U Chi L Rev 751, 789-794. See also LA Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘Paying for long-term 
performance’ (2010) 158 U Pa L Rev 1915; and ibid, ‘Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues’ (2004) 
30 J Corp L 647.  An overview of law and economics research insights on executive remuneration can be found 
in DI Walker, ‘The law and economics of executive compensation: Theory and evidence’ in CA Hill and BH 
McDonnell (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
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both neoclassical and behavioural economics, starting from the standard neoclassical model 
and then refining it by reference to the findings of behavioural economic research. 54 
a. The standard neoclassical economic model of decision-making  
The standard model describes human decision-making based on three fundamental 
assumptions, namely: that individuals are rational, selfish and possess unlimited willpower. 
The notion of rationality in this context is a subject of much debate. The core minimum of the 
notion of rationality refers to ‘choosing the best means to the chooser’s ends’55 which entails 
comparing the cost and benefits of various potential courses of action in terms of the utility and 
disutility they bring to the individual in question and making the choice that maximises his 
utility. In a broader sense, frequently used by economists, rationality is also defined to mean 
that an individual’s preferences comply with the axioms of completeness (all possible 
outcomes are ranked), transitivity (if outcome A is preferred over outcome B and B is preferred 
over C then A is preferred over C), monotonicity (if positive outcomes are bundled the 
individual will prefer the bundle that contains more of at least one outcome and no less of any 
other) and convexity (in ranking various bundled outcomes the individual will prefer averages 
rather than extremes).56 In the broadest sense, rational preferences are defined as coherent, 
                                                          
54 The forthcoming discussion, however, will not examine the literature on the impact of board psychological 
dynamics on the amount of executive remuneration, due to the scope of this article. On this, see CA O’Reilly III 
and BGM Main, ‘Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesis’ 
(2010) 19 Industrial and Corporate Change 675. 
55 RA Posner, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law’ (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1551, 1551. 
56 M Rabin, ‘A Perspective on Psychology and Economics’ (2002) 46 European Economic Review 657. 
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independent of immaterial factors57 and ‘not incompatible with empirical observations known 
to the individual in question’.58  
In the case of decisions made under risk or uncertainty, the standard model assumes 
that rational individuals seek to maximise their expected utility which is calculated using 
Bayesian statistics. A positive net expected value means that the expected future benefits 
arising from a given decision outweigh the expected future losses, the relevant figures being 
calculated based on the probability distribution of all potential outcomes. Most crucially, 
rational choice models assume that individuals are risk averse which is a consequence of the 
axiom of diminishing marginal utility which applies inter alia to wealth. The degree of risk 
aversion of each individual will depend on the shape of their utility function. This means that 
an individual will always prefer – say – to gain £10 rather than to be given a 50% chance of 
gaining £20 (or zero) and to convince them to accept the risky option the expected gain will 
have to be higher than the gain under the risk-free option. Of course, risk-aversion reduces 
significantly or even disappears if an individual has the option of taking a risk multiple times, 
as sophisticated individuals are aware of the law of large numbers, according to which the 
actual ratio of outcomes will converge on the theoretical, or expected, ratio of outcomes, as the 
number of experiments increases. This explains the anecdote related by Thaler involving a 
colleague of him refusing to take a bet on a coin where he would either gain $200 or lose $100 
but proposing instead to take 100 bets in which case he expected to win $5,000 and the chance 
of him making a loss would be extremely small. The apparent inconsistency of preferences 
(rejecting one bet but accepting 100 bets) was described by Thaler as irrational,59 arguably 
                                                          
57 E Shafir and R LeBoeuf, ‘Rationality’ (2002) 53 Annual Review of Psychology 491.  
58 N Wilkinson and M Klaes, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
74 
59 RH Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (WW Norton & Company, 2015), 192 – 195.  
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wrongly so, as it is in line with the mathematical definition of probability, which is only 
applicable to repeated phenomena.60 In any case, this indicates that diversified equity investors 
will tend to be risk-neutral regarding risk-taking by investee companies i.e. they will prefer the 
option with the highest expected value, irrespective of risk. In the case of decisions, the 
outcomes of which occur in the future, the standard models’ assumption is that individuals 
discount future utility compared to present utility at a constant rate and, in that sense, they have 
consistent time preferences. This is due to the risk that the individual may die before the 
outcome materialises.  
The other two fundamental assumptions of rational choice models are less crucial in 
the sense that alternative assumptions can be accommodated by such models with appropriate 
modifications. Selfishness – in the strictest possible sense – means that an individual’s utility 
is independent of the utility of others. In a broader sense, an individual is still selfish if they are 
motivated by what can be termed as impure altruism, that is, emotional benefit or harm arising 
out of the utility or disutility of others. In the broadest sense, an individual’s utility includes 
hedonic pleasure arising out of moral sentiments.61 Finally, the assumption of unlimited 
willpower means that individuals will never knowingly act in a way which conflicts with their 
own preferences. 
 
                                                          
60 According to BV Gnedenko, Theory of Probability (BD Seckler trns, Chelsea Publishing, 1962), 16, ‘a wide 
range of phenomena exists for which, whenever the set of conditions C is realised repeatedly, the proportion of 
occurrences of the event A only seldom deviates significantly from some average value and this number can thus 
serve as a characteristic index of the mass phenomenon’ [emphasis original]. 
61 In the latter sense, all rational behaviour is by definition selfish and therefore the assumption does not have any 
predictive value. For a discussion of self-interest, see Wilkinson and Klaes (above n 58), 393 – 396. 
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b. Modifying the standard model based on evidence from behavioural economics  
Behavioural economics can be defined as a strand of scholarship that seeks to identify and 
classify phenomena that cannot be explained using the standard model described above with a 
view to ‘improving the explanatory power of economic theories by giving them a sounder 
psychological basis’.62 The birth of the field was marked by Kahneman and Tversky’s work on 
prospect theory63 in the late 1970s and its first major application to legal academic thinking 
was marked by the work of Thaler et al in the late 1990s64 who asserted that the analysis of 
legal rules and prescriptive statements about the law ought to take into account evidence 
suggesting that individuals have bounded rationality,65 selfishness and willpower. As it is 
impossible to do justice to the extremely rich behavioural economic literature within the 
constraints of the present study,66 the discussion below will focus on the aspects of behavioural 
                                                          
62 Wilkinson and Klaes (above n 58), 20. See also BS Frey, Economics as a Science of Human Behavior: Towards 
a New Social Science Paradigm (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992). For a brief history of the area, see H 
Schwartz, Rationality Gone Awry? Decision Making Inconsistent with Economic and Financial Theory (Praeger 
Publishers, 1998), 3 – 6. JM Keynes is generally recognised as a forefather of behavioural economics, especially 
his monograph The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan, 1936).  
63 D Kahneman and A Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 
263. 
64 C Jolls, CR Sunstein and RH Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 
147; and ibid, ‘Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman’ (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1593. 
65 On this, see D Kahneman, ‘New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption’ in KJ Arrow and others (eds), The 
Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996). 
66 It is worth noting that according to its proponents, behavioural economic analysis of law raises jurisprudential 
questions around the acceptability of paternalism. Indeed, Thaler is a proponent of a soft type of paternalism. See 
CR Sunstein and RH Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 Uni Chi L Rev 1159. This 
view has met considerable opposition. See e.g. G Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron (2005) 99 
Nw U L Rev 1245. On paternalism generally, see G Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ (1972) 56 The Monist 64. 
23 | P a g e  
 
economics that are most relevant from the perspective of understanding the impact of financial 
incentives on risk taking.  
As such, it is essential to focus on prospect theory. Prospect theory developed to explain 
a series of common phenomena that cannot be explained by standard expected utility theory,67 
such as the status quo bias in consumer choice,68 the very high equity premium69 in capital 
markets, and the longshot bias70 and end of the day effect in horse racing.71 These phenomena 
have now been explained as due to the combined effect of the following cognitive errors: (a) 
reference dependence; (b) loss aversion; (c) uncertainty aversion; and (d) a tendency to estimate 
probabilities in a biased manner.72 Dependence on reference points means that individuals tend 
                                                          
67 For a taxonomy of such phenomena, see CF Camerer, ‘Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field’ 
in D Kahneman and A Tversky, Choice, Values and Frames (CUP, 2000). 
68 This phenomenon refers to consumers being likely to stick to default options to the effect that their ultimate 
choice is heavily influenced by the setting of the default option. See R Korobkin, ‘The Status Quo Bias and 
Contract Default Rules’ (1997) 83 Cornell L Rev 608, esp 625 – 647.  
69 Mehra and Prescott found that in the 1889 – 1978 period in the US, shares perfumed on average 6% higher than 
safe Government bonds. See R Mehra and EC Prescott, ‘The Equity Premium: A Puzzle’ (1985) 15 Journal of 
Monetary Economics 145.  
70 Gamblers tend to bet excessively on horses with a low probability to win.  
71 Gamblers who have made large losses during a racing day tend to make very risky bets towards the end of the 
day as only these bets, if successful, allow them to return to the position they were at the beginning. 
72 The availability bias refers to estimating probabilities based on the availability of relevant recent events in the 
subject’s memory. See A Tversky and D Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ in D 
Kahneman, P Slovic and A Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (CUP, 1982). The 
well-known hindsight bias refers to overestimating the probability of an event once we know that it happened. 
See B Fischhoff, ‘Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty’ 
(1975) 1 Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human Perception and Performance 288. Finally, individuals tend 
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to adopt a certain status quo (either their current state or some expected future state) as a 
reference point to assess whether the various outcomes they are asked to choose from (defined 
technically  as prospects) represent a gain or a loss compared to their status quo. Loss aversion 
means that individuals tend to be much more averse to perceived losses than they are keen to 
achieve gains. As a result, as soon as an individual has incurred large losses compared to their 
reference point, they tend to become risk-seeking in a desperate attempt to return to that point. 
Also attitude to risk depends on the perceived probability of gain or loss. Based on the available 
empirical evidence it appears that most individuals are risk-averse in relation to high and 
medium probability gains, risk-seeking in relation to small probability gains, risk-averse in 
relation to small probability losses and risk-seeking in relation to medium and large probability 
losses.73 Furthermore, empirical evidence implies that the discount applied to future gains and 
losses grows as the gains or losses come further in the future, so that the function of future to 
present utility is mathematically a hyperbole. It follows that preferences are inconsistent over 
time and thus that individuals tend to be irrationally short-termist.74 
The above analysis suggests that, in the absence of any form of performance-sensitive 
remuneration, corporate executives would be likely to refrain from taking optimal risks that 
engender a non-negligible probability of a very severe negative outcome – which includes, but 
is not limited to, the insolvency of the company in question.  Indeed, they would stand nothing 
to gain from taking such risks, but would stand to suffer the risk of losing their position should 
                                                          
to overestimate low and underestimate high probabilities in the case of negative events. See ND Weinstein, 
‘Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events’ (1980) 39 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 806.  
73 A Tversky and D Kahneman, `Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty' (1992) 
5 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 297.  See also M Rabin and RH Thaler, ‘Anomalies: Risk Aversion’ (2001) 15 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 219.  
74 D Laibson, ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’ (1997) 112 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 443. 
25 | P a g e  
 
the severely negative scenario materialise. Empirical evidence suggests that dismissal comes 
at a high cost for executives, as on top of the direct cost of searching for an alternative position 
they are likely to face a considerable period of unemployment and, when they do find 
alternative employment, it is usually at a significantly lower rate of pay. Indeed, a study found 
that a 1% increase in the dismissal risk of a CEO is associated with a 7% increase in the overall 
subjective value of the CEO’s remuneration package, thus supporting the view that being 
dismissed is costly for CEOs. Behavioural analysis suggests that, in the context of decision 
making that can impact a company’s insolvency risk, being dismissed would be perceived as a 
loss compared to current status quo. It follows that managers would tend to overestimate the 
probability of low probability losses and would thus refrain from taking risks that are desirable 
from the perspective of (risk-neutral) diversified shareholders.  
The second area of behavioural economics that is crucial for the purposes of the present 
discussion is game theory and, in particular, the relationship between external and intrinsic 
incentives. Experiments that involve situations where cooperation is rationally desirable for 
both parties, such as the ultimatum game,75 indicate that most individuals will refuse to 
cooperate (thus reducing their material wealth) in order to retaliate against what they perceive 
as unfair behaviour by the other party. Furthermore, experimental evidence suggests that 
                                                          
75 In ultimatum games, a sum that will be earned by the players only if they agree on how to distribute it amongst 
them. One player makes a one-off offer and the other can accept it or reject it. Rationally, it would make sense for 
the offeror to offer the other party a minimal amount and for the other party to accept. However, in reality a wide 
variety of percentages are offered with an average of around 25%. See C Camerer and RH Thaler, ‘Anomalies: 
Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners’ (1995) 9 Journal of Economic Perspectives 209. 
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individuals tend to value their possessions irrationally high due to a feeling of entitlement and 
that if they feel entitled to a gain they are reluctant to share any part of it with others.76  
An implication of the above is that creating external financial motives can remove 
intrinsic motives arising from social norms.77 This observation has led some corporate law 
scholars to doubt the efficacy of performance-based remuneration.78 From the viewpoint of the 
present discussion, this argument implies that regulatory rules such as the bonus cap are 
unlikely to have any effect on senior managers’ behaviour and therefore are immaterial both 
from the perspective of finical stability and from the perspective of shareholder wealth.  
However, the aforementioned studies focus on non-market contexts where strong social norms 
prevail and therefore it is too speculative to try to import their findings in the context of 
professional corporate managers. Indeed, empirical studies focusing on the labour market 
suggest that ‘trust contracts’ where the employer offers a high wage trusting the employee to 
perform well tend to perform very badly and make losses for both parties, whereas ‘bonus 
                                                          
76 For experimental evidence on this, see D Kahneman, JL Knetsch and RH Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’ (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 1325; and L Babcock and G 
Loewenstein, ‘Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases’ (1997) 11 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 109. On the Coase Theorem, see RH Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Costs’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law 
and Economics 1.  
77 EL Deci, R Koestner and RM Ryan, ‘A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effect of 
Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation’ (1999) 125 Psychological Bulletin 627.  
78 For instance, Moore argues that, due to the effect of individuals’ bounded rationality and subjective perceptions 
of relative deprivation, offering the senior managers of a company high levels of variable remuneration in order 
to motivate them can have negative consequences on the motivation of both the beneficiaries of such remuneration 
and other employees. See MT Moore, ‘Corporate Governance, Pay Equity, and the Limitations of Agency Theory’ 
(2015) 68 CLP 431, 449 – 461. See also See GA Akerlof and J.L. Yellen, ‘The Fair Wage Effort Hypothesis and 
Unemployment’ (1990) 105 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 255.   
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contracts’ where the employer reserves discretion to reward the employee if performance is 
good work much better.79 This provides strong support for the effectiveness and of 
performance-based remuneration from the perspective of shareholders and hence for the 
potential significance of remuneration regulation as a tool to protect financial stability.  
 
V. The reaction of major UK banks to the introduction of the bonus cap rule 
The aim of this section is to document the reaction of UK banks to the bonus cap rule, which 
is necessary to assess whether the reform in question is likely to achieve its objective of 
enhancing financial stability. It is worth noting that based on the standard neoclassical model, 
as enriched by behavioural insights, one would expect the subjective value of executive 
remuneration packages in UK banks to remain unaffected by the introduction of the bonus cap 
rule. This is because the subjective value of remuneration packages depends on supply and 
demand in the managerial labour market. Still, the (objective) expected value of remuneration 
packages would be expected to reduce, due to risk aversion. In other words, as banks increase 
the fixed component and reduce the variable component of remuneration packages, the risk 
premium demanded by risk-averse senior managers reduces and hence a package with a lower 
expected value than before will have the same subjective value. Finally, it is reasonable to 
expect the maximum potential value of remuneration packages to reduce more steeply than 
expected value, in tandem with the reduction in variable remuneration.  
All data is taken from the relevant banks’ annual reports and accounts documents for 
2013 and 2014, which are available on their respective websites.80 ‘Major UK banks’ refers to 
                                                          
79 On this, see E Fehr, A Klein and KM Schmidt, Fairness and Contract Design’ (2007) 114 Econometrica 121.  
80 The relevant Annual Reports and Accounts were published in spring 2014 and 2015 respectively.  
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banks that are public companies whose ultimate parent company is a bank or bank holding 
company registered in the UK and whose shares are traded on the London Stock Exchange. At 
the time of writing these include: Barclays Bank plc, HSBC Holdings plc, Lloyds Banking 
Group plc, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc and Standard Chartered plc. 81 UK banks that 
are subsidiaries of foreign banks are excluded as they do not operate within the same company 
law framework.82 The analysis below is limited to the remuneration packages of the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) of the aforementioned banks. This is because banks only disclose 
in full detail the remuneration structure of executive directors rather than senior managers83 
and because the remuneration package of a CEO is generally representative of the remuneration 
structure of all senior executives.84  
The tables below summarise the structure of CEOs’ remuneration packages and the 
actual and potential level of remuneration before and after the implementation of the bonus 
cap.85 The years 2013 and 2014 were chosen because the former was the final year before the 
                                                          
81 In Tables 1, 2 and 3, Standard Chartered Bank plc is abbreviated as SCB. 
82 The most important foreign bank operating in the UK retail market is currently Santander UK plc which is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Spanish bank Banco Santander SA.  
83 For senior managers who are not board members the following pieces of information is disclosed by UK banks 
consistent with the relevant regulatory requirements: (a) the total number of employees whose remuneration 
exceeds £1 million; (b) the total remuneration of the five highest paid employees; and (c) the total remuneration 
and breakdown by component of the eight highest-paid senior executives.  
84 It has been found that CEO remuneration is a significant but partial predictor of the level and structure of 
remuneration of the top management team. See MA Carpenter and WG Sanders, ‘Top Management Team 
Compensation: The Missing Link Between CEO Pay and Firm Performance?’ (2002) 23 Strategic Management 
Journal 367, 372. 
85 All sums are given in the currencies reported by the banks, that is, British Pounds Sterling for all banks except 
for the data for Standard Chartered Bank which is given in US Dollars. 
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implementation of the bonus cap rule and the latter was the first year after its implementation 
and hence comparing between these two years illustrates the rule’s impact. ‘Actual 
remuneration’ refers to the amount paid with respect to performance during a financial year 
even if it is subject to some performance conditions in the future. ‘Potential remuneration’ 
refers to the maximum amount of remuneration under the relevant component that the 
remuneration committee could have awarded for a given year based on the bank’s remuneration 
policy. In the case of bonuses all banks set a maximum potential award and decide annually 
how much of that – if any – is to be awarded to each executive director. In the case of LTIPs, 
however, most banks simply make a set award which is a function of an executive’s salary so 
that the incentivisation effect is only due to the nature of the payment, that is, in shares. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
As can be seen in Table 1, UK banks had to make considerable changes to the structure 
of their executive remuneration packages to ensure that the ratio between fixed and variable 
components does not exceed the prescribed maximum. Their original position was one where 
the available variable remuneration was between 3.5 and 6 times the fixed components with 
the exception of RBS, which was already operating within the CRD IV imposed limit. This is 
probably attributable to the fact that the Treasury has had since 2009 a majority stake in RBS. 
Indeed, RBS is the only UK major bank which has not yet sought shareholder approval to 
extend variable pay to 200 per cent of fixed pay following the procedures prescribed by the 
Directive. All other banks obtained such approval at the respective 2014 annual general 
meetings, and it is notable that the overwhelming majority of their shareholders voted in favour. 
Conversely, many major banks have not made use of the possibility of benefiting from the 
Directive’s discount rate, which appears to only have been utilised by RBS and Lloyds, 
possibly due to the very demanding deferral requirements in place for remuneration to qualify 
for the discount, and the modest rate of discount. With regard to the actual level of remuneration 
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paid out the picture is mixed, with an increase in Barclays, and Lloyds, a small decrease in 
HSBC and a significant decrease in Standard Chartered and RBS.  
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
The introduction of the bonus cap rule had a major impact on the fixed component of 
bank CEO remuneration packages, 86 as is evident from Table 2. Total fixed remuneration 
increased dramatically in 2014 in all banks apart from RBS: 87 by 91 per cent in HSBC, by 86 
per cent in Standard Chartered, by 65 per cent in Barclays and by 55 per cent in Lloyds. This 
was achieved mostly by introducing a new type of fixed remuneration described as an 
allowance and paid in shares, which are released pro rata over a period of five years, 88 and 
occasionally by increasing pension contributions and benefits in kind. It is notable that the bank 
which introduced the highest role-based allowance compared to CEO salary, HSBC, was also 
the bank that had to adapt its executive remuneration structure more to comply with the bonus 
cap. Thus, fixed pay allowances appear to operate as quasi-variable remuneration. Indeed, the 
use of fixed pay allowances can be explained as an attempt to maintain the pay performance 
sensitivity of executive remuneration packages despite the cap, as will be explained in the next 
part of the article.  
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
                                                          
86 This includes the following elements: salary, fixed allowance, pension contribution and benefits.  
87 The figure for the CEO of RBS in 2013 is adjusted to reflect the annual rate of pay. In fact, Ross McEwan 
joined RBS on 1 October 2013, so the actual amounts paid were 25 per cent of those appearing on the table.  
88 No such allowance was paid with regard to 2014 but RBS remuneration policy provided for a potential fixed 
allowance paid wholly in shares of a value up to 100 per cent of an executive director’s salary. Such allowance of 
£1m was actually paid with respect to 2015.  
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Table 3 demonstrates the change in variable remuneration that resulted from the 
implementation of the bonus cap rule. Regarding the structure of variable remuneration, out of 
the five major UK banks, RBS and Standard Chartered now use a single component of variable 
remuneration, while Barclays, HSBC, and Lloyds follow the more conventional policy of using 
both annual bonuses and LTIPs. It should be clarified that the values shown in Table 3 represent 
the present value of the shares awarded to each CEO with respect to the relevant financial, 
subject to a vesting period of 3 to 5 years. These figures should not be confused with the actual 
value of shares that vest during a given financial year, which is the value included in the total 
annual remuneration figure provided by many banks. The effects of CRD IV are not yet fully 
visible with regard to the latter figure as the shares were awarded before the coming into force 
of the Directive, which only applies to remuneration earned from 2014 onwards. 
From Tables 1, 2 and 3, we can calculate the substitution ratio of variable remuneration 
by fixed remuneration. This is the ratio of the increase in fixed remuneration to the decrease in 
maximum available variable remuneration. Expressed as a percentage, the substitution ratio 
was, in 2014, 27.7% in Barclays, 41.5% in HSBC, 123% in Lloyds, and 44.5% in SCB. In 
RBS, there was no increases in fixed remuneration in 2014, but there was in 2015 in which 
year the substitution ratio amounted to 69.4%. As explained at the beginning of this section, 
we would expect the increase in fixed pay to be lower than the reduction in the maximum 
potential variable pay, as the change makes the overall level of remuneration less subject to 
risk. This has two effects. First, executives will only need to be compensated for the expected 
value of the reduced variable components which is much less than their maximum potential 
value. Second, the change reduces the risk premium demanded by senior executives as a result 
of their risk aversion. The very high ratio in Lloyds is probably attributable to the bank’s 
effective return to full private sector ownership during the relevant period and the consequent 
increase in overall remuneration of all types. The other banks’ ratios are all considerably below 
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100% thus confirming the hypothesis that total available remuneration would decrease after 
the implementation of the bonus cap rule.  
Overall, the examination of the response of major UK banks to the bonus cap rule reveals 
that overall levels of available remuneration have decreased in most banks, as expected due to 
the reduction of the element of risk in remuneration packages and that banks have sought to 
minimise the impact of the rule on incentives by introducing role-based allowances which are 
paid in shares. Of course, neither the expected value of remuneration packages nor their 
subjective value can be surmised from publicly available information on which the previous 
analysis is based. This could be explored by future empirical research.  
 
VI. Evaluating the bonus cap rule from the perspective of financial stability  
This part assesses the likely impact of the bonus cap rule on risk taking by financial institution 
senior managers and hence on financial stability. The discussion will challenge the Directive’s 
core assumption, shared by some academic commentators,89 that the total amount of available 
variable remuneration and its relative size to fixed remuneration are the main factors 
determining incentives to take decisions that increase financial institutions risk of failure. At 
this point a caveat is necessary. The analysis below is based on the remuneration structure of 
UK banks, which is based on the UK regulatory framework, and thus does not automatically 
apply to banks incorporated in other EU Member States.90 A detailed examination of the effect 
                                                          
89 See eg A Johnston, ‘Preventing the Next Financial Crisis? Regulating Bankers' Pay in Europe’ (2014) 41 J Law 
& Soc 6, 25 – 26.  
90 In any case, most non-UK EU banks were not significantly affected by the bonus cap rule as they never paid so 
high variable remuneration. In 2013, the average ratio of variable to fixed remuneration for high earners in the 
UK banking sector was 400%, while in all but four other Member States it was up to 250%.  See European Banking 
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of the bonus cap rule in other Member States is a very interesting line for future research, but 
evidently falls outside the scope of the discussion herein.  
(a) Understanding how various forms of remuneration shape risk-taking incentives 
It is essential to note that making part of executive remuneration dependent on performance 
conditions is not the only technique available to set incentives. Regular reviews of fixed pay 
levels with a view to increasing basic salary in line with the growth of the company’s size or 
profitability is per se a mechanism that creates a financial incentive to pursue the maximisation 
of shareholder value or (as the case may be) the expansion of the relevant company’s size. 
More crucially, paying remuneration in shares or share options rather than cash is a powerful 
tool to set incentives. Share options have been demonstrated to produce perverse incentives to 
take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders as they reward strategies that 
increase a company’s share price volatility. 91 As a result, they have become unpopular in recent 
years, and no major UK bank uses them at the time of writing. Awarding shares that vest in the 
future, however, is seen as a powerful tool to align the interests of senior managers with the 
interests of diversified shareholders and is heavily used in the UK. In the case of banks, at least 
50% of variable remuneration must be paid in shares.92 As was discussed in the previous part, 
fixed pay allowances are also paid in restricted shares by all major UK Banks. The award of 
                                                          
Authority, ‘Benchmarking of Remuneration Practices at the European Union Level and Data on High Earners’ 
(EBA-OP-2016-05, 30 March 2016), 17 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-report-on-benchmarking-
of-remuneration-practices-in-the-eu>. 
91 Share options have not been used recently by any major UK banks and have fallen in popularity in the corporate 
sector in recent years. For a critique of share options, see MC Jensen, KJ Murphy and EG Wruck, ‘Remuneration: 
Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are The Problems, and How To Fix Them’ (Harvard Business 
School NOM Research Paper No. 04-28, 12 July 2004), 59 – 61 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305>. 
92 PRA Rulebook, CRR Firms, Remuneration 15.15.  
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restricted shares ensures that over time a senior manager will always have a substantial number 
of shares vesting in any given year and therefore will have a sustained incentive to ensure that 
in any given year share prices are as high as possible. This is, of course, problematic from the 
perspective of financial stability as the level of risk that is optimal for shareholders is excessive 
from the perspective of the public interest.  
In parallel, the power of boards and shareholders to remove senior management (strictly 
speaking CEOs and other executive directors, but this has knock-on effects on other senior 
managers) can also create incentives to take an optimal level of risk. Therefore, taking optimal 
risk (and thus assuming some risk of dismissal due to the company’s increased insolvency risk) 
can be the best strategy to minimise the chances of being dismissed. However, it seems that 
despite the rise in shareholder activism in the UK in recent years, directors are still unlikely to 
be removed unless a company is seriously underperforming,93 and hence remuneration remains 
the major technique used to ally the interests of senior management with the interests of 
shareholders. The same is not necessarily true for boards of directors, which are more likely to 
                                                          
93 This is a complex issue which cannot be fully tackled within the limits of the present discussion. For a succinct 
discussion of UK shareholders voting powers and the practical limitations to their use, see MT Moore, Corporate 
Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013), 208 – 212. A broader discussion of the balance of powers 
between directors and shareholders can be found in JG Hill, ‘The Rising Tension between Shareholder and 
Director Power in the Common Law World’ (2010) 18 Corporate Governance: An International Review 344.  
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remove underperforming CEOs, especially when consisting of a large majority of independent 
directors,94 as is the case in all major UK banks.95  
Let us then examine the incentives faced by bank senior managers with regard to taking 
decisions that they expect to maximise the bank’s value, but which entail an increase in the risk 
of failure. Senior managers who follow optimally risky strategies will maximise the chances 
of receiving the highest possible level of variable remuneration, to the extent that the latter is 
sensitive to financial performance. 96 In addition, pursuing optimal strategies also maximises 
the value of any shares already held by senior managers, irrespective how they came to own 
them. It is also likely that pursuing optimally risky strategies will lead to an increase in basic 
salary in tandem with an increase in the company’s size. The latter normally has a knock-on 
effect on future variable remuneration opportunity levels which are typically a function of an 
executive’s basic salary. Finally, taking optimally risky decisions minimises a senior 
manager’s the risk of dismissal by the board or failure of re-election by the shareholders in all 
cases except for the case that the risk actually leads to the bank’s failure.   
Conversely, the financial cost of pursuing optimally risky strategies for a hypothetical 
senior manager is as follows. If a given strategy leads to the failure of the relevant bank the 
senior manager in question will fail to earn any variable remuneration for the relevant financial 
year and will lose any unvested shares awarded in previous years as part of LTIPs, fixed-pay 
                                                          
94 See MS Weisbach, ‘Outside Directors and CEO Turnover’ (1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 431. See 
also V Laux, ‘Board Independence and CEO Turnover’ (2008) 46 Journal of Accounting Research 137. 
95 As of 1 April 2017, the percentage of independent board members (excluding board chairmen) in major UK 
banks was as follows: 84.6% in Barclays, 76.2% in HSBC, 76.9% in Lloyds, 76.9% in RBS and 78.6% in Standard 
Chartered.  
96 For a discussion of pay-performance sensitivity, see Jensen and Murphy (above n 52), 144 – 148.  
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allowances or bonus.97 In addition, he will also lose the value of any shares already vested but 
retained either due to a mandatory retention period (or due to the institution’s shareholding 
requirement for senior executives) or voluntarily retained. Depending on the relevant 
contractual terms (commonly referred to as clawback clauses),98 the senior manager will also 
have to pay back the value of vested variable remuneration, such as the cash portion of bonuses, 
and the consideration for shares that have already been sold, for up to seven years. Furthermore, 
the cost of pursuing an optimal level of risk includes the direct cost of dismissal.  
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
Table 4 summarises the benefits and cost of pursuing optimally risky strategies (from 
the perspective of shareholders) for bank senior managers. 99 It is evident that variable 
remuneration generates incentives to avoid bank failures in a number of ways:100 (a) loss of 
variable pay for the year during which the negative outcome occurs; (b) loss of awarded but 
unvested shares with respect to previous years; (c) liability to repay the cash portion of previous 
years’ bonuses and the proceeds of realised performance shares for a number of years; and (d) 
loss of the value of any vested shares owned at the time of insolvency. So, apart from 
encouraging risk taking, variable remuneration in banks also creates some incentives to avoid 
failure which are strengthened by the combined effect of regulatory rules, such as deferral 
periods, retention periods and claw-backs. It therefore follows that both the ratio between fixed 
and variable remuneration and the absolute amount of variable remuneration are not by 
                                                          
97 On the regulatory rules on variable remuneration deferral, see above n 21 and accompanying text.  
98 On the regulatory rules on clawback, see above n 24 and accompanying text. 
99 In Table 4, the terms ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ refer to the subjective value to senior managers of what they perceive 
to be the expected cost and benefit of a course of action.  
100 For a discussion of variable remuneration as a risk management tool, see JE Thanassoulis, ‘The Case for 
Intervening in Bankers’ Pay’ (2012) 67 The Journal of Finance 849. 
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themselves relevant factors, a finding that questions the utility of the bonus cap rule. That being 
said, the second and third of the benefits listed on Table 4 depend on pay-performance 
sensitivity, which might indeed have been reduced as a result of the implementation of the 
bonus cap rule, as will be explained below.   
(b) Exploring the impact of the bonus cap rule on bank executives’ incentives 
The following paragraphs will explore the ways in which the bonus cap rule reduces pay-
performance sensitivity and thus works positively to enhance financial stability, but also the 
ways in which it reduces the cost of failure for senior management or removes incentives to act 
prudently, thus leading to negative unintended consequences.  
Regarding the positive effects of the bonus cap, it has evidently reduced the size of 
potentially available bonuses and LTIPs,101 thus reducing the amount of money at risk if 
performance targets are not met. This, of course, is only relevant to the extent that performance 
criteria are linked to profitability such as total shareholder return and earnings per share as such 
criteria incentivise behaviour that entails optimal risk taking from the shareholders’ 
perspective. In parallel, in view of the incentive effect created by payment in shares per se, the 
cap reduces the number of shares awarded as part of bonus and LTIP schemes to the extent that 
it reduces the potential size of these remuneration components. Of course, these benefits can 
be undermined if banks increase the elasticity of remaining variable remuneration components. 
The latter technique entails making variable remuneration more steeply connected to 
performance which can compensate for the size of variable remuneration. For instance, a 
variable component that ranges from 0 to £1 million and will be £0.5 million for average 
performance and £1 million for top performance (amongst a selected basket of comparable 
companies) results in a similar level of elasticity as a package ranging from 0 to £0.5 million 
                                                          
101 As can be seen in Table 3.  
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that provides 0 for average performance and £0.5million for top performance, assuming they 
both increase at the same rate and that performance conditions in both cases are equally 
attainable. Of course, the difference would be that in the second case no incentives are created 
as soon as performance drops below average, so the overall incentive is not the exactly same. 
Still, from the perspective of the present discussion it is important to note that making variable 
remuneration more sharply connected to financial performance can undermine the reduction of 
risk taking incentives achieved by the bonus cap rule.  
Turning to the unintended consequences of the bonus cap, they mostly flow from 
undermining the positive effect of other regulatory rules such as the claw back rules. Indeed, 
reducing the size of variable remuneration reduces the amounts that can be clawed back in case 
of an adverse subsequent event. Also, reducing the potential size of variable remuneration 
reduces what executives stand to lose if they perform badly with respect to the relevant 
performance period. Furthermore, increasing the relative size of fixed remuneration compared 
to variable remuneration reduces banks’ ability to make quick and large reductions of executive 
remuneration in case they face difficulties, thus increasing the total salary expenditure of ailing 
banks which in itself increases the risk of failure.102  
Furthermore, unlike LTIP awards, fixed pay allowances are not subject to performance 
conditions during a vesting period, and cannot be clawed back in case of an adverse change in 
a bank’ s financial position. This means that paying executives a given amount of money as a 
fixed pay share allowance creates powerful incentives to take risky decisions, in some cases 
even to act in a risk-seeking manner without the mitigating factors of the possibility to cancel 
vesting and claw back vested awards that exist in the case of LTIPs. In addition, if the amount 
of fixed pay allowances is reviewed more regularly than basic salaries to reflect the 
                                                          
102 On the views of the PRA, see above n 2 and accompanying text.  
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performance of the relevant bank (as appears to be part of the reason for introducing this new 
type of remuneration) this creates a further positive incentive to take risks that are optimal from 
the shareholders’ perspective. This goes against the Directive’s policy of removing incentives 
to increase banks’ level of risk and is a clear manifestation of the phenomenon of adverse 
unintended consequences of regulatory measures.103  
Indeed, behavioural economics insights suggest that paying part of (fixed or variable) 
remuneration in restricted shares can cause senior managers to act in a risk-seeking manner in 
certain circumstances thus creating perverse incentives to take risk that is excessive even for 
risk-neutral shareholders let alone for financial stability. The reason for this is the phenomenon 
of loss aversion and the observation that individuals tend to be risk-seeking with regard to high 
probability losses. This analysis requires us to appreciate that senior managers will adopt a 
given remuneration level as their reference point. In the case of remuneration paid in shares, 
this will probably be the value of the shares at the time of the award. If at the time of vesting 
the value of the shares has increased, this will be perceived as a gain and if it has decreased as 
a loss. So, an executive who shorty before the vesting time observes that the value of unvested 
shares has dropped significantly, will perceive this as a high probability loss and will be likely 
to take a very high level of risk, as only such risk taking can restore the value of the portfolio 
                                                          
103 The area of the regulation and governance of executive remuneration is one where unintended consequences 
are a frequent and serious phenomenon. For instance, the disclosure of levels of remuneration has arguably led to 
an increase of the overall levels of remunerations. See EM Matsumura and JY Shin, ‘Corporate Governance 
Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences’ (2005) 62 Journal of Business Ethics 
101. Dignam has also discussed this problem in A Dignam, ‘Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate 
Governance in the Age of Entitlement’ (2013) 66 CLP 401, 403. A notable critique of economic inequality was 
advanced recently by Picketty See T Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 
2014), 330 – 333. 
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to the reference point.104 This effect will be stronger if executives have accumulated a 
significant number of vested shares over time to the extent that they are free to dispose of them. 
Also, the closer senior managers are to retirement the stronger such perverse incentives are, as 
they have less to lose in terms of dismissal and reputational cost if a risk turns out badly. 
An additional unintended consequence of the bonus cap rule is that it has led to a 
reduction in cash bonuses in some major banks. Empirical evidence suggests that bonus 
payments in cash are correlated with lower bank default risk and should therefore be 
encouraged by prudential regulation.105 This is due to the fact that bonuses are lost if an 
institution fails and, as they are payable in cash, their value does not grow in tandem with the 
institution’s share price. In that sense, the reaction of Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds to the cap, 
which involved a significant reduction in the annual cash bonus opportunity available to their 
CEOs is deplorable from a prudential regulation perspective.106  
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
Table 5 summarises the positive and negative consequences of the bonus cap rule. 
Overall, the introduction of fixed pay allowances paid in shares, the regular revision of the 
                                                          
104 On the contrary, behavioural economic research suggests that the positive effect of performance-based 
remuneration in encouraging risk-taking will be smaller than expected particularly in relation to strategies with a 
high probability of success, as senior executives are likely to be risk-averse in such circumstances. 
105 Indeed, Vallascas and Hagendorff conclude that: ‘Our results show that banks where CEOs receive large bonus 
payments (both in absolute terms as well as relative to their total cash compensation) display lower levels of 
default risk. […] Thus, CEO cash bonuses are solvency-contingent and, therefore, incentivize CEOs to avoid 
institutional failure.’ F Vallascas and J Hagendorff, ‘CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence 
from the U.S. and Europe’ (2013) 22 Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 47, 84. 
106 Compared to 2013, bonus opportunity in 2014 was lower by 29.8% in Barclays, 36.1% in HSBC and 37.8% in 
Lloyds. RBS and SCB were not using cash bonus at all in the relevant period. The data derives from Table 3.  
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amount of fixed pay allowances and a likely increase in the elasticity of remaining variable 
remuneration components may outweigh the prima facie reduction in pay-performance 
sensitivity resulting from the reduced ratio of variable to fixed remuneration. At the same time, 
the cap comes at a cost to bank shareholders. As the cap reduces the relative weight of annual 
bonuses which can incentivise particular aspects of individual performance beyond risk taking, 
it has no doubt had a negative impact on the amount of effort that senior managers are 
incentivised to make.  The reduced flexibility in designing remuneration packages due to the 
need to comply with the maximum ratio of fixed and variable remuneration may make it more 
difficult to align senior management and shareholder interests, especially with regard to 
providing adequate motivation for exceptional levels of performance, as illustrated by 
Murphy’s recent study.107 
The preceding analysis suggests that the bonus cap rule is a blunt tool and that it is by 
no means clear whether its advantages outweigh its shortcomings. This finding is corroborated 
by available empirical evidence suggesting that the bonus cap rule has had no effect on risk 
taking by bank senior managers.108 If the cap is to be retained, an obvious way to reduce its 
unintended consequences would be to stipulate that fixed remuneration cannot be paid in 
                                                          
107 KJ Murphy, ‘Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences’ 
(2013) 19 European Financial Management 631. On the unintended economic consequences of the cap, see also 
G Ferrarini, ‘CRD IV and the Mandatory Structure of Bankers' Pay’ (2015) ECGI Law Working Paper N° 
289/2015 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593757>. 
108 This finding derives from a survey of financial institution staff discussed in Commission, ‘Assessment of the 
remuneration rules under Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013’ (Report) COM (2016) 510 
final, 10.  
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shares, nor is financial instruments the value of which depends on the share price109, and that 
remuneration contracts ought to last for a minimum term, during which no revision of 
remuneration is possible. This, of course, would not mitigate the remaining negative 
consequences of the bonus cap rule which might still outweigh its benefits.  
Assuming that more radical regulatory reforms in the area are possible, the present 
analysis suggests that instead of focusing on the ratio between fixed and variable remuneration, 
regulation should focus on limiting the award shares as part of executive remuneration 
packages in banks. Conversely, variable remuneration paid in cash does not create incentives 
to increase a bank’s risk of failure.110 If it was coupled with the existing deferral and claw back 
requirements, it could positively incentivise senior managers to avoid failure. This would entail 
abandoning the bonus cap rule and the current rule that compels banks to pay half of variable 
remuneration in shares.111 The successful implementation of such a reform would require 
regulation to prescribe in more detail the type of criteria used to award variable remuneration, 
both financial and non-financial, with a view to ensuring that taking decisions that increase the 
risk of failure does not lead to higher awards of variable remuneration. This could be achieved 
by requiring banks to use financial performance metrics that are appropriately risk-weighted 
and a preponderance of non-financial metrics which depend on a bank’s safety and soundness, 
such as the total value of non-performing loans and loan impairments.  
 
                                                          
109 Regarding share options, which are not currently used by any major UK banks, there are strong arguments for 
explicitly prohibiting their use altogether as they create perverse incentives to take risks that are not desirable even 
for (risk-neutral) shareholders. See Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (above n 91).  
110 See Vallascas and Hagendorff (above n 105).  
111 See above n 20 and accompanying text.  
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VII. Conclusions 
Having examined the effect of the bonus cap rule on the incentives of bank senior managers to 
take risks that are undesirable from a financial stability point of view, it is submitted that it is 
not clear whether the rule has resulted in any reduction in incentives to take excessive risk, and 
it is not impossible that it might, in fact, have caused such incentives to increase. Indeed, the 
bonus cap rule is a blunt tool that has had some positive impact but has also resulted in adverse 
unintended consequences which may have fully outweighed the benefits of the rule. Of course, 
calculating the exact level of pay-performance sensitivity before and after the reform is not 
feasible based on publicly available information alone and falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
Such research question would be an appropriate area of interrogation for future quantitative 
empirical work. At the same time, the bonus cap rule also comes at an inevitable cost to bank 
shareholders.  
Indeed, it was demonstrated that the bonus cap rule may have failed to deliver its 
intended effect in the UK for two main reasons: on the one hand, CRD IV erroneously conflates 
the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration with the overall level of pay-performance sensitivity, 
and, on the other, the rule neglects the partially positive role of variable remuneration in 
ensuring that senior bank managers stand to suffer a personal financial loss if the bank they 
work for fails. It thus stands as an illustration of the inherent difficulties associated with 
attempting to impose inflexible regulatory rules on sophisticated corporate entities, and of the 
risks associated with taking prompt legislative or regulatory measures to respond to the lack of 
public confidence in banks following a financial crisis, without full consideration of the likely 
consequences of such measures. If the cap is to be retained, it must be strengthened by 
prohibiting fixed remuneration from being paid in shares. If more radical reforms are possible, 
the analysis herein suggested abandoning the bonus cap rule in favour of focusing on rules that 
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would restrict the ability of banks to pay part of executive remuneration in shares or similar 
financial instruments.  
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Table 1. The impact of the bonus cap on major bank CEOs’ total remuneration 
 Year Barclays 
£ 000 
HSBC 
£ 000 
Lloyds 
£ 000 
RBS 
£ 000 
SCB 
$ 000 
Actual total 
remuneration 
2014 6,409 6,977 6,990 3,053   4,719 
2013 5,864 7,375 6,685 4,512   9,505 
Potential total 
remuneration  
2014 7,239 10,725 7,898 3,053 14,157 
2013 9,714 13,125 7,730 4,512 14,615 
Ratio of max 
variable to fixed 
remuneration 
2014 200% 200% 212% 104% 200% 
2013 564% 600% 352% 198% 412% 
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Table 2. The impact of the bonus cap on major bank CEOs’ fixed remuneration 
 Year Barclays 
£ 000 
HSBC 
£ 000 
Lloyds 
£ 000 
RBS 
£ 000 
SCB 
$000 
Salary 2014 1,100 1,250 1,061 1,000 1,826 
2013 1,100 1,250 1,061 1,000 1,680 
Role-based 
allowances 
2014    950 1,700    900 - 1,100 
2013 - - - - - 
Total fixed pay 2014 2,413 3,575 2,530 1,493 4,719 
2013 1,464 1,875 1,630 1,512 2,855 
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Table 3. The impact of the bonus cap on major bank CEOs’ variable remuneration 
 Year Barclays 
£ 000 
HSBC 
£ 000 
Lloyds 
£ 000 
RBS 
£ 000 
SCB 
$ 000 
Max. potential 
bonus 
2014 1,930 2,395 1,708 - - 
2013 2,750 3,750 2,745 - - 
Ratio of max. 
bonus to fixed pay 
2014 80% 67% 67% - - 
2013 188% 200% 146% - - 
Max. potential 
LTIP award 
2014 2,896 4,755 3,660 1,560 9,438 
2013 5,500 7,500 3,355 3,000 11,760 
Ratio of max. 
LTIP to fixed pay 
2014 120% 133% 145% 104% 200% 
2013 376% 400% 206% 198% 412% 
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Table 4. The factors determining the incentives of senior managers to take optimal risk 
Benefits of pursuing an optimally risky strategy 
(in case it is successful) 
Cost of pursuing an optimally risky strategy 
(in case it leads to the company’s failure) 
1. Possible increase in amount of fixed 
remuneration and consequent increase in 
future variable remuneration opportunity. 
1) Loss of any elements of unvested 
variable remuneration (bonuses and 
LTIPs). 
2. Increased pay-offs under existing variable 
remuneration schemes. 
2) Losses due to the claw-back of variable 
remuneration that has already vested. 
3. Increase in the value of shares owned, both 
unvested and vested. 
3) Loss of value of any vested shares 
owned by the senior manager. 
4. Reduction of risk of dismissal due to being 
too conservative in taking risks. 
4) Losses due to dismissal (cost of finding 
new post and reputational cost). 
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Table 5. The positive and negative impact of the bonus can rule on financial stability 
Positive impact Negative impact 
Reduction of future payoffs under bonus and 
LTIP schemes that depend on profitability. 
Reduction of bonus and LTIP awards to be 
lost in case of adverse financial events. 
Reduction of the value of shares awarded as 
part of bonus and LTIP schemes. 
Reduction of amounts that are subject to be 
clawed back in case of adverse events.  
 Incentives to take excessive risk due to fixed 
pay allowances paid in shares. 
 Reduction of the ability of banks to decrease 
remuneration in times of financial distress. 
 
 
